Tedford's lose-lose/win-win situation

Tedford was always going to be criticized for
 his fourth down decision.
(AP Photo/Jay LaPrete)

Let’s agree on this first: if Cal coach Jeff Tedford had gotten that 4^th-and-1 call “right,” there would be no debate and no outrage.

Getting it “right” in this case would have been Tedford making a decision and his team successfully executing it. At the same time, getting it “wrong” was Tedford making a decision and his team failing at execution.

Tedford, after seeing his team tie Ohio State 28-28 and his defense forcing a turnover, let the play clock run down, called time out (we’ll talk about this later) and sent Vince D’Amato out for the 42-yard field goal attempt.

We all know what happened. Tedford—in the eyes of many—was emphatically “wrong.” As the distraught fan in the row in front of me at Ohio Stadium expressed as the Buckeyes celebrated a 35-28 victory over Cal: “Fire Tedford! Fire Tedford! Fire Tedford!”

But no one could have predicted what would have happened. If that were the case, games of any form would be no fun.

The anger comes from something called heuristics (go ahead and use Wikipedia for that or you can read this research paper). Whatever the outcome, people already have a predisposed set of feelings and beliefs. When it comes to sport—and Cal, particularly a Tedford-coached Cal team—it’s easy to predict the feelings fans will have after a particular outcome. You either supported Tedford’s decision or you didn’t, and all of that was based on the outcome of that particular decision. Since the decision failed, the opposite choice would have provided fans with the outcome that they think they desperately wanted.

It’s easy for fans to second guess the decision making of the team’s head coach. Yes, fans are invested in the game, but only vicariously. Fans don’t have to live with the consequences, the coaches and players do.

The first thing that comes to mind is a decade’s old study by UC Berkeley economics professor David Romer that analyzed fourth-down opportunities in NFL games. The study was both hailed and criticized by those within the sport’s brain trust.

Romer’s basic argument (seen here in a 2006 update) was that football teams did not try to go for the first down often enough when it faced a fourth down situation. He said that when a team has fourth-and-short (fourth down and three yards or less) offensive teams should try for the first down. Romer also suggested that teams should go for first downs (or touchdowns) more often once they cross the 50-yard line into enemy territory. The rewards outweigh the risks.

                                            

So, I instantly thought that Tedford should let his offense try to achieve the first down.

But, just like with most complex ideas, Romer’s argument is often taken out of context. Romer looked at fourth down situations only during the first quarter of NFL games. He did not want to analyze other moments because they become too complicated—decision making also becomes situational.

Situational was what Tedford faced late in that fourth quarter in Columbus.

The Bears were tied 28-28 on the road in front of 105,000 strong at Ohio Stadium. Before Tedford saw his defense force a turnover on what was essentially another Ohio State three-and-out, he saw the Buckeyes march 11 plays for 75 yards for a touchdown. That was Ohio State’s only drive that lasted longer than six plays. The Cal defense came to play.

Then there's all of the external context that surrounded the game, which most players and coaches say do not have any effect on the actual play on the field (but it's still fun to mention it).

The team hadn’t defeated the Buckeyes since the 1921 season (a fact that only journalists like to point out, but may be in the minds of the coaches and players, if only subconsciously). The last time Cal was victorious over a ranked opponent was in 2009. The last time Cal scored a true road victory (The Big Game does not count) was on Sept. 29, 2007 (which is also the last time I was truly satisfied with this football team).

And now the Bears have the ball, 4th-and-1 on Ohio State’s 25-yard line with their first real opportunity to get that win against a ranked opponent.

Another variable Tedford has to look at is his kicker’s ability to make the kick. D’Amato missed two field goals earlier in the game. Does that play into the decision of whether to go for the first down or not?

Of course it does, but not as much as taking the lead against a ranked opponent on the road. Assured points (if the kicker makes the kick) are better than more uncertainty, which is what Cal would have faced if it succeeded on getting the first down.

The first down did not ensure a touchdown. It did not ensure points. What it did ensure was the opportunity for a turnover or points, which was the same situation that Tedford faced on fourth down.

In Tedford’s analysis, his decision to kick the field goal on fourth down was going for “it.”

“When its 28-28 on the scoreboard and there are four minutes left to play, we are going to go for it,” he said. “We wanted to put some points on the board.”

But the fans didn’t see it that way, if you check out the various message boards. The press didn’t even see it that way either, if you check out ESPN’S Pac-12 blog or Jeff Faraudo’s blog.

Part of this came probably from the timeout he called just before sending D’Amato to kick the field goal. Most of the time, fans think when the head coach calls a time out during a situation like that, the team is drawing up a play that would guarantee its success in achieving the first down.

Maybe it would be a fake. Maybe it would be another trick play (like the double reverse pass to quarterback Zach Maynard earlier in the game).

But it wasn’t and the fans were caught off guard with Tedford’s decision, mostly because to the situation was perfectly framed. And since it was only Tedford’s decision, the fans anger was focused on him.

And at the same time, if D’Amato had connected, and Cal had won, there would be no second-guessing or anger.

That’s because Tedford was either going to be seen as a savant or the goat.

As it turns out, he’s still the goat.

But anyone could have predicted that.